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The crisis takes a much longer time coming than 
you think, and then it happens much faster than you 
would have thought, and that’s sort of exactly the 
Mexican story. It took forever and then it took a night.
 —Rudiger  Dornbusch1
SUMMARY
  Successive plans to restore conﬁdence in the euro area 
have failed. Proposals currently on the table also seem 
likely to fail. The market cost of borrowing is at unsus-
tainable levels for many banks and a signiﬁcant number 
of governments that share the euro. 
  Two major problems loom over the euro area. First, the 
introduction of sovereign credit risk has made nations 
1. Interview with Rudiger Dornbusch for Frontline Special on Murder, 
Money, and Mexico, PBS, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/mexico/interviews/dornbusch.html.
and subsequently banks eﬀectively insolvent unless they 
receive large-scale bailouts. Second, the ensuing credit 
crunch has exacerbated diﬃculties in the real economy, 
causing Europe’s periphery to plunge into recession. This 
has increased the ﬁnancing needs of troubled nations well 
into the future. 
  With governments reaching their presumed debt limits, 
some commentators are calling on the European Central 
Bank (ECB) to bear the costs of additional bailouts. The 
ECB is now treading a dangerous path. It feels compelled 
to provide adequate “liquidity” to avert systemic ﬁnancial 
collapse, yet must presumably limit its activities in order 
to prevent a loss of conﬁdence in the euro—i.e., a change 
in market and political sentiment that could lead to a 
rapid breakup of the euro area.
  Five measures are needed to enable the euro area to 
survive: (1) an immediate program to deal with excessive 
sovereign debt, (2) far more aggressive plans to reduce 
budget deﬁcits and make peripheral nations “hypercom-
petitive” in the near future, (3) supportive monetary 
policy from the ECB, (4) the introduction of mechanisms 
that credibly achieve long-term ﬁscal sustainability, and 
(5) institutional change that reduces the scope for exces-
sive leverage and consequent instability in the ﬁnancial 
sector. 
  Europe’s leaders have mainly focused on a potential long-
term ﬁscal agreement, and the ECB under Mario Draghi 
is setting a more relaxed credit policy; however, the other 
elements are essentially ignored. 
  This crisis is unique due to its size and the need to coor-
dinate 17 disparate nations. We give four examples of 
economic, social, and political events that could lead to 
more sovereign defaults and serious danger of systemic 
collapse. Each trigger has some risk of occurring in the 
next weeks, months, or years, and these risks will not 
disappear quickly. 
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1. THE EURO AREA’S LAST STAND
For over two years Europe’s political leaders have promised to do 
whatever it takes to save the euro area. Yet problems are growing 
and solutions still seem far oﬀ. The October 27 and December 
9, 2011 agreements of European leaders failed to change the 
dangerous trends in Europe’s economies or markets. As ﬁgure 1 
illustrates, the implicit risk of default priced in sovereign bond 
markets reached all-time highs in the last three months. The 
trend is similar with bank default risk. The crisis is continuing 
to get deeper, broader, and more dangerous.
A combination of misdiagnosis, lack of political will, and 
dysfunctional politics across 17 nations have all contributed 
to the failure so far to stem Europe’s growing crisis. We start 
by outlining our view on the main problems that are pushing 
the euro area towards collapse. We then turn to potential solu-
tions (although we are very aware that the complexity of the 
problems in Europe renders any solution questionable), and 
ﬁnally we outline several factors that could trigger rapid ﬁnan-
cial collapse in the euro area.
2. KEY SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS IN THE EURO 
AREA
Within the complex sphere of Europe’s crisis, if we had to pick 
one issue that turns this crisis from a tough economic adjust-
ment into a potentially calamitous collapse, we would argue 
it is the transformation of Europe’s sovereign debt market. 
We outline this in section 2.1 and then discuss the economic 
ramiﬁcations in sections 2.2 and 2.3.
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2.1 European Sovereign Bonds Are Now Deeply 
Subordinated Claims on Recessionary Economies
In an earlier Policy Brief, we laid out the case that the euro 
area’s immediate problems, in large part, reﬂect transition 
from a regime where sovereign debts were perceived to be 
sacrosanct (“risk-free”) to one in which investors perceived 
that sovereign defaults were possible.2 Neither investors nor 
Europe’s politicians understood the full ramiﬁcations of no 
bailout clauses in the Maastricht treaty until recently. With 
the new risk premium needed to compensate for default risk, 
some European nations will need to radically reduce their debt 
levels and change its maturity structure. 
The treatment of private investors in the upcoming Greek 
debt restructuring has made it ever clearer that Europe’s sover-
eign bonds bear substantial risk. On July 27, 2011, the EU 
Council of Ministers ﬁnally admitted that a Greek default was 
needed—although to date they prefer to describe this default as 
voluntary, referring to it as private sector involvement (PSI).3 
By choosing a default over bailouts, the politicians have de facto 
inserted a new clause into all European sovereign bonds:
In the event that the issuing sovereign cannot 
adequately ﬁnance itself in markets at reasonable 
interest rates, and if a suﬃcient plurality of the EU 
Council of Ministers/Eurogroup/ECB/IMF/the Issuer 
determine it is economically or politically expedient, 
then this bond may be restructured. 
Soon after this announcement it was apparent Greece 
could not aﬀord the proposed deal, and more funds would be 
needed. At the summit on October 27, 2011, Europe’s leaders 
announced that for Greek debt the PSI “haircut” would rise 
from 21 to 50 percent in order to provide these funds, while 
the oﬃcial creditors promised no additional funds speciﬁcally 
for Greece.4 
Those nonoﬃcial creditors holding Greek bonds learned 
a new lesson: They are the residual ﬁnanciers to European 
issuers when the troika’s programs fail.5 The Greek press 
2. Peter Boone and Simon Johnson, Europe on the Brink, Policy Briefs in 
International Economics 11-13, July 2011, Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, available at www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb11-13.pdf.
3. For the deﬁnition of PSI in the euro area context, see page18 in European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), available at www.efsf.europa.eu/
attachments/faq_en.pdf.
4. At the July 21, 2011 summit euro area leaders called for €109 billion of 
oﬃcial assistance. On October 26 they committed to €100 billion of oﬃcial 
assistance. The IMF did not provide any additional commitment in October.
5. The troika is the informal name given to the European Union, ECB, and 
the IMF, which negotiates the terms of external assistance to Greece and other 
troubled peripheral countries.
reported that the government was prepared to change laws 
governing its bonds in order to force nonoﬃcial creditors to 
bear these losses. For nonoﬃcial creditors, a further clause has 
thus been eﬀectively and implicitly inserted into European 
sovereign bonds:
In the event of default (i) any non-oﬃcial bond holder 
is junior to all oﬃcial creditors and (ii) the issuer 
reserves the right to change law as needed to negate 
any rights of the nonoﬃcial bond holder. 
We should not underestimate the damage these steps have 
inﬂicted on Europe’s €8.4 trillion sovereign bond markets. For 
example, the Italian government has issued bonds with a face 
value of over €1.6 trillion. The groups holding these bonds 
are banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and Italian 
households. These investors bought them as safe, low-return 
instruments that could be used to hedge liabilities and provide 
for future income needs. It was once hard to imagine these 
could ever be restructured or default. 
Now, however, it is clear they are not safe. They have 
default risk, and their ultimate value is subject to the political 
constraint and subjective decisions by a collective of indi-
viduals in the Italian government and society, the ECB, the 
European Union, and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). An investor buying an Italian bond today needs to 
forecast an immediate, complex process that has been evolving 
in unpredictable ways. Investors naturally want a high return 
in order to bear these risks. 
Investors must also weigh carefully the costs and beneﬁts 
to them of oﬃcial intervention. Each time oﬃcial creditors 
provide loans or buy bonds, the nonoﬃcial holders become 
more subordinated, because oﬃcial creditors including the 
IMF, ECB, and now the European Union continue to claim 
preferential status. Despite large bailout programs in Greece, 
Portugal, and Ireland, the market yield on their bonds remains 
well above levels where they are solvent. This is partly due to 
the subordinated nature of these obligations. De facto, if not 
de jure, Europe’s actions have turned these bonds into junior 
claims on troubled economies.  
Once risk premiums are incorporated in debt, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Italy do not appear solvent. For example, 
with a debt/GDP ratio of 120 percent and a 500-basis-point 
risk premium, Italy would need to maintain a 6 percent of 
GDP larger primary surplus to keep its debt stock stable rela-
tive to the size of its economy.6 This is unlikely to be politically 
sustainable. 
6. A 500-basis-point risk premium is consistent with an annual 10 percent risk 
that something will trigger a decision to restructure and that there would be a 
50 percent mark-to-market loss on bonds under such an event.NUMBER PB12-4  JANUARY 2012
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2.2 Crisis Spreads into Europe’s Core Banks and 
Incites Capital Flight from the Periphery
On August 27, 2011, Christine Lagarde, the managing 
director of the IMF, shocked European oﬃcialdom with a 
speech decrying inadequate capital levels in European banks.7 
She referred to analysis by IMF staﬀ showing that, if European 
banks were stressed for market-implied sovereign default 
risks, they were €200 billion to €300 billion short of capital. 
Lagarde’s speech was courageous and the logic of her analysis 
raised deep concerns.8 This was the ﬁrst time the IMF admitted 
that sovereign default risk needed to be taken into account for 
the largest banks in Europe. Europe’s regulatory regime does 
not require banks to have equity capital funding for sovereign 
debt—there is no capital requirement, in banking jargon—so 
banks accumulated these debts over many years under the 
assumption no additional capital would be needed. They must 
now revisit those portfolios to take account for capital needs 
on risky sovereign debt. 
However, the IMF analysis of the capital needs to oﬀset 
this risk was odd. Markets price in a small risk of sovereign 
default, yet a major sovereign default would be a large, discrete 
event. Regulators need to decide: Sovereigns are safe, in which 
case banks need little capital protection against sovereign 
default, or they are not safe. If they are not safe, then banks 
need to accumulate adequate capital—raising their equity rela-
tive to total assets—to survive plausible sovereign defaults. For 
example, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data show 
French banks in June 2011 had claims worth $109 billion (on 
an ultimate risk basis) on Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and 
Spain (GIIPS); if these nations were to default on their sover-
eign claims, then French banks would surely experience large 
losses on the entirety of this portfolio while the repercussions 
for France’s own economy would add further domestic losses.9 
If sovereign default risk is not removed, then banks need 
nearly full equity funding to cover plausible states of nature 
where disorderly defaults do happen. The lesson for banks is 
7. Christine Lagarde, speech at Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City confer-
ence, Jackson Hole, August 27, 2011, available at www.imf.org/external/np/
speeches/2011/082711.htm.
8. European politicians ﬁrst dismissed Lagarde’s analysis and later the 
European Banking Authority revised down the needs to €114 billion. They 
argued that the IMF failed to take into account a potential rally in the price 
of safe haven bonds, such as France and Germany, which banks hold on their 
balance sheets. We believe the analysis far underestimates the potential capital 
needs since it does not take into account the full macroeconomic ramiﬁcations 
of sovereign default.
9. Bank for International Settlements, Table 9D: Consolidated foreign claims 
of reporting banks—Ultimate risk basis, BIS Quarterly Review, December 
2011, available at www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1112_anx9d_u.pdf.
clear: They need to reduce exposures to troubled nations and 
batten down the hatches. 
In addition, Europe’s peripheral banks are suﬀering large 
deposit losses as capital moves to safer nations. Figure 2 shows 
the enormous capital ﬂight that is occurring through the 
banking sector across the euro area. These Target2 balances 
show a cumulative transfer of €440 billion from peripheral 
nations to Germany from early 2009 to October 2011. Were 
it not for these implicit bailouts through the payments system, 
the euro area would have already collapsed. 
2.3 Macroeconomic Programs: Too Timid to Restore 
Confidence or Growth
While it may already be too late to avoid extensive defaults, 
we can still consider what needs to be done to reduce the 
risk of default. To avoid defaults and restructurings, Europe 
needs to introduce policies that bring market risk premiums 
on sovereign (and hence bank) debts down. Investors need 
to feel conﬁdent that, with a 2 to 3 percent risk premium, it 
is worth the risk to hold onto several trillion euros worth of 
troubled nations’ sovereign debts, as well as the much larger 
nonsovereign debts. 
In a nation with a ﬂexible exchange rate, adjustment is 
usually achieved with budget cuts and a sharp devaluation. 
Since euro area nations have forgone their right to devalue, 
they need to regain competitiveness through price and wage 
cuts, while even more sharply cutting budget spending. In 
essence, they need to increase volatility of their wages, prices, 
and budgets if they are prepared to forgo similar changes that 
could be achieved through the exchange rate. 
The available evidence from the outcomes of the troika 
programs in Portugal, Ireland, and Greece, as well as the recently 
announced budget plans in Italy and Spain, suggests current 
policies will fail at this task. These programs all plan for gradual 
reductions in budget deﬁcits, implying continued buildup of 
total government debts, while partially substituting private debt 
for oﬃcial debt. In Portugal and Ireland the programs rely on 
external ﬁnancing until 2013 when it is anticipated the program 
countries will reenter markets to ﬁnance ongoing budget deﬁ-
cits and ever higher debt stocks at modest interest rates. In Italy, 
optimistic growth assumptions help bring the budget to balance 
in 2013, but debt stocks remain far too high. Spain announced 
it would miss its 2011 budget deﬁcit target of 6 percent, raising 
it to 8 percent. In Greece, budget revenue and GDP growth 
forecasts are again proving too optimistic. 
Any successful program must recognize the fact that 
appetite for periphery debt amongst investors will not recover 
to “precrisis” levels, because default risk is now a reality that NUMBER PB12-4  JANUARY 2012
5
was not foreseen prior to 2009 and because debt stocks are 
now higher in the periphery. For example, Ireland is currently 
running a budget deﬁcit measured at 12.5 percent of GNP.10 
10. Ireland’s GNP is substantially smaller than its GDP. Due to its role as a tax 
haven, many foreign companies have set up operations in Ireland, with a con-
trolling shell company located in a tax-free nation, in order to take advantage 
of Ireland’s regulations that specify that the controlling owner, rather than the 
resident company, is subject to tax. For this reason companies such as Google, 
Yahoo, Microsoft, Forest Labs, and many others channel license revenues and 
royalties through Irish subsidiaries. These royalties and revenues are in large 
part excluded from the tax base in Ireland. These companies would move if 
Ireland changed rules and made such revenues taxable. Since the relevant con-
cept for ﬁscal sustainability is the taxable base, it makes sense that this should 
be used to measure Ireland’s indicators. No other nation in Europe has a large 
diﬀerence between GNP and GDP. The IMF regularly reported Irish GNP in 
its staﬀ reports but abruptly removed all reference to GNP in the most recent 
report. This raises concerns that the IMF is attempting to mask ﬁscal sustain-
ability problems by not reporting these data.
The troika program calls for that budget deﬁcit to fall to 10.6 
percent of GNP in 2012. Ireland’s stock of oﬃcial debt will 
reach 145 percent of GNP in 2013, while it also has contin-
gent liabilities to its banking sector that amount to over 100 
percent of GNP. An investor looking at these numbers must 
recognize there is serious risk of default. Since market access is 
highly unlikely, who will ﬁnance Ireland from 2013 onwards?
A successful program must also take steps to quickly 
improve competitiveness. Figure 3 shows the change in 
European unit labor costs within and outside the euro area.11 
The only nation that shows moderate improvement is Ireland, 
but this is largely a statistical artefact driven by the decline 
11. Unit labor costs also include nontraded goods and are not a perfect mea-
sure of competitiveness, but the general pattern shown in ﬁgure 3 appears to 
be accurate. Germany has really diverged from its European trading partners.









GIIPS = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain
Source: Eric Dor, The Enormous Loans of the Deutsche Bundesbank to Distressed European Countries’ Central Banks, Working Paper 2011-ECO-08, November 2011, ESEG 
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of unproductive industry in the weighting.12 Italian Prime 
Minister Mario Monti’s program includes no general wage 
cuts.13 In Portugal, the government abandoned attempts to 
engineer unit labor cost reductions through “internal devalua-
tion” after meeting political opposition. In Ireland, the Croke 
Park accord prevents the government from further reducing 
public-sector wages.14 Despite nearly two years of troika 
programs, Greek unit labor costs have hardly budged.
With sovereign risk premiums rising, and capital ﬂowing 
out of the periphery from banks while deﬁcits and compe-
tiveness improve little, it is not surprising that peripheral 
economies are in trouble. Figure 4 shows a leading indicator of 
12. Ireland’s nontraded goods sector is less productive than its traded goods 
sector (which includes companies such as Google that choose to report earn-
ings in this low corporate tax environment.) As part of the Irish recession, the 
nontraded goods sector has contracted while “exports” from large multination-
als have remained relatively robust.
13. See, for example, Alex Roe, “Monti’s Measures for Italy,” Italy 
Chronicles, December 5, 2011, available at http://italychronicles.com/
montis-measures-for-italy.
14. See Harry McGee, “Freeze on cuts after Croke Park accord,” Irish 
Times, July 21, 2011, available at www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ire-
land/2011/0721/1224301063698.html.
economic activity for Europe’s major economies and troubled 
nations. A level below 50 of the Purchasing Managers’ Index 
(PMI) indicates output is likely to decline in the future. These 
data present a bleak picture. It is no coincidence that a new 
major “downturn” started soon after German politicians made 
clear they were planning to let Greece default. It is also clear 
that the troika programs are failing to restore growth.  
Figure 5 shows the pattern of unemployment across 
the euro area. The stark contrast between Germany and the 
periphery reﬂects the dynamics of the crisis. The strong core is 
becoming stronger, while Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain 
have high unemployment. Italy’s troubles are recent, so with 
a sharp recession beginning, we anticipate Italian unemploy-
ment will soon rise sharply too.
3. SOLUTIONS
Europe may continue to veer towards a major ﬁnancial 
collapse. European economies are in decline due to capital 
outﬂows from fear of sovereign and bank defaults. Recessions 
and continued budget deﬁcits only raise the risk of default. 
Macroeconomic adjustment programs are not strong enough 
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and do not reﬂect the large measures needed given the lack 
of exchange rate devaluation. As the GIIPS decline, there is 
serious risk that other indebted and heavily banked nations in 
the euro area, such as France, Belgium, and Austria, could be 
pulled into trouble themselves. 
3.1 The Big Bazooka
Some analysts are now calling for a massive ECB-led bailout 
to arrest sovereign risk and stop this dangerous trend. The 
general hope is that, if the ECB oﬀered to massively ﬁnance the 
periphery, investors would return to buying those sovereign and 
bank bonds. Lower interest rates would give breathing space for 
sovereigns to correct budget deﬁcits and banks to build capital.
To see how feasible this is, ﬁrst consider the sums required. 
Any bailout would need to unequivocally convince investors 
that for several years these nations will simply not see serious 
ﬁnancial problems. This means the bailout would need to have 
enough funds to buy up a large portion of the existing stock of 
“risky sovereign debts” plus ﬁnance those nations for, say, ﬁve 
years. The bailout must buy the debt, rather than simply reﬁ-
nance debt rollovers, since otherwise secondary market interest 
rates would stay high. The secondary market rates will determine 
the lending capacity of local banks and their creditworthiness. 
The second bar of ﬁgure 6 shows the sums required to 
purchase 75 percent of the outstanding government debts 
of the troubled nations (leaving aside debt owed to oﬃcial 
lenders), plus ﬁnance their deﬁcits over ﬁve years. In this base 
case we assume troika programs are implemented and deﬁcits 
decline gradually over ﬁve years. The total adds to €2.8 tril-
lion, or 29 percent of euro area GDP. 
We then contrast this with alternative assumptions. In the 
ﬁrst bar we assume a more rapid reduction in budget deﬁcits, 
so that by 2016 most nations are near balance. In the third bar 
we assume only a modest improvement on 2011 budget deﬁcit 
levels. 
The last bar illustrates the dangerous risk facing the euro 
area if a “bazooka” is employed and yet the troika programs 
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fail to restore growth and improve budgets. Here we assume 
budget deﬁcits decline only modestly, and we calculate the 
ﬁnancing needed to cover deﬁcits until 2020. Our negative 
outcome implies nearly €5 trillion would be needed just for 
GIIPS, something the IMF implicitly ﬂagged when they 
reported recently that Greece alone may need €500 billion 
(one half trillion) by 2020.15
Successful “bazooka” interventions often occur when the 
extra ﬁnancing is no longer needed, so that the ﬁnancing acts 
as a backstop but is hardly used. For example, when Poland 
launched its stabilization program in early 1990, the $1 
billion stabilization fund was never spent. The US Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) was quickly repaid by almost all 
15. This is a stress scenario in the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis for Greece. 
In our view, this scenario could reasonably be regarded as something closer to 
a baseline forecast.
banks. This is not possible for the euro area. Some euro area 
nations have too much debt in the new regime with default 
risk. In the early days of such a program we expect large 
purchases would be needed. The ECB would have to drive 
market interest rates down to levels where private creditors 
would not be well rewarded to hold the debts. As the ECB 
purchased the debts, private creditors would be further subor-
dinated, and this would add to their desire to sell their bonds. 
There are many reasons we believe such ECB “bazooka” 
programs won’t occur and are potentially dangerous to euro 
area survival. First, while using the ECB balance sheet may 
make such risks more opaque, any large bailout still poses 
potential heavy losses for Germany and other healthy members 
of the euro area. In the event there is default in the GIIPS, 
Germany would be responsible for 43 percent of the capital 
needs of the ECB. Hence with a bailout fund of €2.8 tril-
lion, Germany would be assuming €1.2 trillion, or 45 percent 
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of German GDP, in credit risk. The Bundesbank and other 
national central banks are likely to refuse.
Second, this measure on its own does not resolve competi-
tiveness problems or large budget deﬁcits in the periphery. It 
would undoubtedly cause the euro to fall but the beneﬁts of 
euro depreciation are somewhat muted since Germany would 
remain relatively competitive compared with the periphery. 
The periphery will still need aggressive ﬁscal and wage cuts to 
improve their deﬁcits and competitiveness relative to Germany. 
Third, it would place the unelected ECB governors in a 
political role they were never intended to play and were legally 
forbidden to play according to the Maastricht treaty. The 
ECB could quickly become the largest creditor to peripheral 
nations, and as their ﬁnancier it would ultimately need to 
negotiate budget programs, wage cuts, and structural change. 
It may choose to relinquish those powers to the IMF, but it 
would be the true power behind all these negotiations. 
Finally, the bazooka could well incite an eventual crash 
of the euro area. As ﬁgure 6 illustrates, if the ECB embarked 
on a program to backstop troubled nations, observers would 
quickly recognize that the potential sums needed to maintain 
stability could be large. Our bad case scenario implies over 
341 percent of the ECB monetary base and 46 percent of euro 
area GDP might be needed. For markets, what matters are 
the perceived future bailout costs. Hence, an announcement 
of a “bazooka” will lead to varying reactions in markets as the 
perceived bailout needs rise and fall. Investors could become 
very afraid if peripheral adjustment programs appear to fail 
or bailout needs spread to more nations. Such concerns could 
rapidly cause ﬁnancial-market turmoil and euro area collapse 
(see section 4). 
3.2 A More Comprehensive Solution
If the bazooka is unlikely and probably won’t work, while the 
status quo is failing, what is an alternative? The focus needs 
to be on returning the relevant sovereigns to solvency. Once 
the sovereigns are solvent, most commercial banks will have 
breathing space to rebuild capital through operating proﬁts 
and retained earnings. 
However, there is no easy means to achieve this. In our 
assessment, the GIIPS will need to restructure their debts by 
extending maturities and reducing coupons to levels that they 
can aﬀord. There is some scope for oﬃcial assistance to oﬀset 













Sources: Bloomberg; International Monetary Fund; and authors’ calculations. 
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Some analysts are now calling for 
a massive ECB-led bailout to arrest 
sovereign risk and stop this dangerous 
trend…. We believe such ECB “bazooka” 
programs won’t occur and are potentially 
dangerous to euro area survival.
the total costs of such restructuring by subsidizing debt swaps. 
However, the Greek example suggests Europe’s politicians have 
little appetite to provide more taxpayer funds for this purpose.
While preemptive restructuring seems attractive, the 
needed extent and scope is unclear. Carmen Reinhart and 
Kenneth Rogoﬀ argue that countries with no lenders of last 
resort typically run into problems when debt levels reach 60 
percent of GDP.16  Even if we assume advanced European 
economies could manage more debt, it would not be higher 
than the 90 percent that Reinhart and Rogoﬀ ﬂag as a threshold 
for developed markets. Such ﬁgures imply that greater than 50 
percent writedowns of nonoﬃcial debt in Portugal and Ireland 
may be needed, while Italian debt writedowns might be close 
to 50 percent. 
If the GIIPS followed preemptive restructurings, Europe’s 
core banks, insurance companies, and pensions funds would 
need substantial recapitalizations, and the costs of this could 
draw France and other core nations into debt crises of their 
own. Hence, any plan to preemptively restructure debts would 
need to be applied carefully across Europe. 
The second ingredient is a far more aggressive program 
to reduce budget deﬁcits and improve competitiveness in the 
periphery. These nations need to be highly competitive if they 
are to generate growth soon given the large risks overhanging 
their economies. This requires large wage cuts, public-sector 
spending cuts, changes in tax policy to attract investment and 
business, and stable politics. 
If these two steps were implemented, then a bailout 
program from the ECB would pose lower risks. The debt 
restructuring and measures to improve competitiveness would 
mean far less funds were needed. The ECB’s role could be 
to provide conﬁdence that stability would be maintained—
16. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoﬀ, “Growth in a Time of Debt,” 
paper prepared for American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, January 
7, 2010, available at www.economics.harvard.edu/ﬁles/faculty/51_Growth_
in_Time_Debt.pdf.
a sensible central bank role—rather than to reﬁnance large 
amounts of debt and deﬁcits.
While these steps would be a major improvement on 
current programs, they are hardly likely to be implemented. 
As discussed in section 2, the troubled nations have declined 
to implement large budget and wage cuts. Political conditions 
have prevented them. Meanwhile, creditor nations are claiming 
there will be no more debt restructurings beyond Greece, and 
at the same time the creditors are refusing to substantially 
raise bailout funds needed to prevent high interest rates and 
default. None of this leads to a credible path out of crisis.
4. PLAYING WITH FIRE: WAYS THE EURO AREA 
COULD COME TO AN END 
Policymakers often have trouble grasping the danger that 
small tail risks pose to leveraged systems. As we discussed 
above, a mere 10 percent annual risk of an Italian crisis is 
already inconsistent with Italian long-term solvency. If Italy 
has a disorderly crisis, how safe are French banks? And if 
those banks aren’t safe, how safe is France’s sovereign debt? 
Low-probability bad events can very quickly generate a wave 
of collapse through leveraged systems. 
Our concern is that, when compared with ﬁnancial crises 
elsewhere, the potential triggers for a euro area collapse are 
numerous.
4.1 A Unilateral Exit, or the Credible Threat of One
At a midnight press conference on November 2, 2011 in 
southern France, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy for the ﬁrst time entertained 
the idea that a nation could leave the euro area. Merkel and 
Sarkozy chose to take a hard line with Greek politicians and 
their electorate: either complete the existing agreement or 
leave. The background to this threat was the tough politics 
in Greece. After 18 months of large budget cuts and some 
structural reforms, Greece’s economy remains in decline. 
Prime Minister George Papandreou’s government was weak, 
and in a last desperate gesture he attempted to force further 
reforms through by oﬀering Greek citizens a referendum with 
an implicit choice of “reform or exit.” 
An exit from the euro area can be forced in minutes. The 
Eurosystem only needs to cut oﬀ a national central bank from 
the payments system and prevent that nation from printing 
new cash euros. Once this is achieved, a bank deposit in Greece 
would no longer be the same as a deposit in Germany, because 
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When compared with financial crises 
elsewhere, the potential triggers for 
a euro area collapse are numerous.
one would not be able to transfer it to a non-Greek bank. Of 
course, the moment people understand such a change could 
be imminent in their nation, they would run to their banks 
and attempt to withdraw cash or transfer funds. This is what 
is now happening in Greece. The country is losing 2.5 percent 
of GDP monthly in deposits from banks.17 
There would be enormous, painful ramiﬁcations for all 
of Europe if Greece or another nation made a disorderly exit. 
Since there is no legal basis for exit, all ﬁnancial contracts and 
indebtedness between Greek and non-Greek entities would 
have uncertain value as the parties could dispute whether 
these are to be paid in drachmas or euros. Trade between the 
exiting nation and the rest of the euro area would dry up. The 
mere fact that a country did exit would have ramiﬁcations for 
the other troubled nations, most likely inciting further capital 
ﬂight from those nations and producing sharp economic 
downturns. This in turn would question the viability of 
Europe’s core banks and some of the core sovereigns. The euro 
itself would probably weaken sharply, and “currency risk” 
would be added into the euro.
4.2 The Weak Periphery Lashes Out against Germany, 
while Germany Fights Back
The political dynamics of crisis invariably pit creditors against 
debtors, potentially leading to ﬂareups that cause creditors to 
give up. In Ireland, against strong popular opposition, the ECB 
is forcing Irish citizens to take on further debt in order to bail 
out creditors of bankrupt banks. In Greece, Prime Minister 
Papandreou was essentially ordered to revoke his planned 
referendum, while Greece’s opposition leader was ordered to 
write a letter promising he supported Greece’s troika program, 
despite the fact that he clearly did not support it nor did he 
participate actively in any negotiations to agree to it. French 
and German politicians are also playing an instrumental 
role in supporting Italy’s new technocratic prime minister, 
while they eschewed former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi 
towards the end of his term. Meanwhile in Germany, “bailout 
17. Deposits have declined by €61 billion, or 24 percent of GDP, since spring 
2009. See Bank of Greece, “Aggregated balance sheets of monetary ﬁnancial 
institutions (MFIs),” available at www.bankofgreece.gr/Pages/en/Statistics/
monetary/nxi.aspx.
fatigue” has set in as electorates and politicians turn against 
more funds to nations that, they perceive, are failing to reform 
suﬃciently quickly. 
While there are many outcomes of such discord, one 
possibility is that it leads to a messy grab for power. The 
troubled nations already have the power to take over decision 
making at the ECB. They may well usurp control in order to 
provide much larger ECB bailouts. This would raise concerns 
in ﬁnancial markets and could lead to rising long-term yields 
on all euro-denominated debts. Germany would be forced 
to pay more to ﬁnance itself, and German savers would ulti-
mately be paying for the periphery bailouts through inﬂation 
and a weak euro. In Germany this would lead to rising calls to 
leave the euro area. 
Once there is a small risk that Germany could leave, 
market prices for euro-denominated assets would again 
change sharply. New risk premiums would need to be added 
to national debts where nations are expected to have weak 
currencies, while Germany and other strong nations might 
see their risk premiums fall even further. Such changes would 
reinforce the dynamics, outlined in section 2, where the core 
nations continue to strengthen relative to the periphery, but 
those changes would also be highly destabilizing for ﬁnancial 
markets.
4.3 Economics of Austerity May Fail
The third risk for the euro area is that economic, political, and 
social realities eventually prove that the system simply cannot 
work. After all, the euro area is a dream of political leaders that 
has been imposed on disparate economies. Few nations sought 
popular support to create the euro. The German leadership 
avoided a referendum, and in France the Maastricht treaty was 
passed with a thin majority of 51 percent. Marine Le Pen, who 
is third in opinion polls for the spring 2012 French presiden-
tial election, is calling for France to leave the euro area and 
reintroduce the franc. Even though most European leaders are 
highly committed to maintaining this dream, no one can be 
sure what the costs are in order to keep it. 
A plausible negative scenario is that those costs, in 
the eyes of the electorate, eventually appear too high. The 
evidence to date suggests Europe’s periphery, even in a fairly 
benign outcome, will be condemned to many years or even a 
decade of tough austerity, high unemployment, and little hope 
for future growth. A good comparison is the “lost decade” of 
the 1980s in Latin America when nations hardly grew due to 
the large debt overhangs from unaﬀordable debts. However, 
those nations had the beneﬁt of ﬂexible exchange rates, while 
Europe’s periphery faces a more diﬃcult period with uncom-NUMBER PB12-4  JANUARY 2012
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petitive economies. Latin America’s problems ended only 
when the creditor nations accepted large writedowns and debt 
restructuring.
Another comparison would be the heavily indebted 
United Kingdom during the 1920s when the government 
managed policies to restore currency convertibility after the 
war. Britain suﬀered with a weak economy for a decade, before 
ending in the Great Depression, despite a booming global 
economy throughout the 1920s. However, this too is not a 
good comparison since Britain had far more ﬂexible wages and 
prices than Europe’s periphery, with nominal wages falling 28 
percent during the 1920–21 recession.
4.4 Markets Lose Patience
Our ﬁnal scenario is the most likely. Faced with the reality of 
failing adjustment programs, diﬃcult politics, and rising risks 
that one or more peripheral nations may rebel, or Germany 
may rescind its support, investors may simply decide that the 
cumulative risks mean the euro area has a moderate risk of 
failing.
If investors decide there is a low but signiﬁcant probability 
that the euro area might fail, we believe Rudiger Dornbusch’s 
observation that crisis happens “much faster than you would 
have thought” would be realized. Here’s why: The failure 
of the euro area will be a calamitous ﬁnancial event. If one 
believes the euro might fail, one should avoid being invested 
in European ﬁnancial institutions, and in euro-denominated 
assets, until the outcome of the new pattern of currencies is 
clearer.
As a result, a large swathe of euro-denominated assets 
would quickly fall in value. The euro itself would cheapen 
sharply, but so would the value of European bank debt and 
European shares, and most sovereigns would see their bonds 
trade oﬀ sharply. This in turn would make it expensive for 
even the Germans to raise ﬁnance in euros. Despite their 
impeccable credit record, they would be attempting to issue 
bonds in what is perceived as a ﬂawed currency. 
A small risk of the euro “breaking up” would have great 
importance for the euro swap market. This market is used 
by Europe’s insurance companies, banks, and pension funds 
to hedge their interest rate risk. A swap contract allows, for 
example, a pension fund to lock in a long-term interest rate for 
their investments, in return for promising to pay short-term 
interest rates to their contract counterparty. It is an impor-
tant market that underlies the ability of insurance companies, 
pension funds, and others to make long-term commitments 
to provide society with annuities, pensions, and savings from 
insurance policies. The notional value of these swaps is many 
times euro area GDP. 
The trouble is, the euro swap market could quickly collapse 
if markets begin to question the survival of the euro. Euro 
swap rates are calculated as the average interest rate paid on 
euro-denominated interbank loans for 44 of Europe’s banks. 
Approximately half of these banks are in “troubled nations.” 
So the interest rate will reﬂect both inﬂation risk and credit 
risk of the participating banks. If investors decided that the 
euro may not exist in several years’ time, swap interest rates 
would naturally rise because people would be concerned that 
banks could fail and that the “euro” interest rate could turn 
into something else—for example, the average of a basket of 
new currencies with some, such as the Greek drachma, likely 
to be highly inﬂationary. 
If euro swap interest rates start to reﬂect bank credit risk 
and inﬂation risk from a euro breakup, then the market would 
no longer function. A pension fund could no longer use it to 
lock in an interest rate on German pensions since it would not 
reﬂect the new German currency rates. The holders of these 
contracts would, eﬀectively, have little idea what they would 
be in a few years’ time. Hence, investors would try to unwind 
their swap contracts, while the turmoil from dislocations in 
this massive market would cause disruptive and rapid wealth 
transfers as some holders made gains while others lost. If the 
euro swap market ran into trouble, Europe’s ﬁnancial system 
would undoubtedly face risk of rapid systemic collapse.
This example illustrates why a small perceived risk of 
a euro area breakup could rapidly cause systemic ﬁnancial 
collapse. The swap market is only one mechanism through 
which collapse could ensue.
On November 23, 2011 Germany was unable to sell 
as many bonds as it wished.18 The auction failure caused an 
immediate steepening in the German sovereign bond yield 
curve. Some German oﬃcials argued this failure was due to 
“volatile markets,” but there is a more fundamental concern. 
Germany’s ability to pay low interest rates in euro-denomi-
nated assets requires the euro area be a ﬁnancially stable 
region. Today, German yields remain very low and are not 
at worrying levels. However, if these rates were to rise due 
to fears of currency breakup risk, then the euro area would 
quickly enter deep crisis as even Germany would have trouble 
ﬁnancing itself. 
18. Paul Dobson, “German Auction ‘Disaster’ Stirs Crisis Concern,” 
Bloomberg News, November 23, 2011, available at www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-11-23/germany-fails-to-receive-bids-for-35-of-10-year-bunds-
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5. DREAMS VERSUS REALITY
There is no doubt that European political leaders are highly 
committed to keeping the euro area together, and so far, there 
is widespread support from business leaders and the population 
to maintain it. There is also, rightly, great fear that disorderly 
collapse of the euro area would impose untold costs on the 
global economy. All these factors suggest the euro area will hold 
together.
However, many ﬁnancial collapses started this way. A 
far more dramatic creation and collapse was the downfall 
of the ruble zone when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. 
Argentina’s attempt to peg its currency to the dollar in the 
1990s was initially highly successful but ended when its poli-
ticians and society could not make the adjustments needed 
to hold the structure together. The Baltic nations—Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania—have managed to maintain their pegs 
but only after dramatic wage adjustments and recessions.
More relevant, the various exchange rate arrangements that 
Europe created prior to the euro all failed. With the creation 
of the euro, Europe’s leaders raised the stakes by ensuring the 
costs of a new round of failures would be far greater than those 
of the past, but otherwise arguably little has changed to make 
this attempt more likely to succeed than the previous one. Small 
probabilities of very negative events can be destabilizing. A lot of 
things can go wrong at the level of individual countries within 
the euro area—and one country’s debacle can easily spill over to 
aﬀect default risk and interest rates in the other 16 countries. 
The euro swap market is based, in part, on interest rates charged 
by 44 banks in a range of countries; about half of these banks 
may be considered to be located in troubled or potentially trou-
bled countries. If the euro swap market comes under pressure or 
ceases to function, this would have major implications for the 
funding of all European sovereigns—including those that are a 
relatively good credit risk.
At the least, we expect several more sovereign defaults and 
multiple further crises to plague Europe in the next several 
years. There is simply too much debt, and adjustment programs 
are too slow to prevent it. But this prediction implies that the 
long-term social costs, including unemployment and reces-
sions rather than growth, attributable to this currency union 
are serious. Sometimes it is easier to make these adjustments 
through ﬂexible exchange rates, and we certainly would have 
seen more rapid recovery if peripheral nations had the leeway 
to use exchange rates.
When we combine multiple years of stagnation with 
leveraged ﬁnancial institutions and nervous ﬁnancial markets, 
a rapid shift from low-level crisis to collapse is very plausible. 
European leaders could take measures to reduce this risk 
(through further actions on sovereign debt restructurings, 
more aggressive economic adjustment, and increased bailout 
funds). However, so far, there is little political will to take these 
necessary measures. Europe’s economy remains, therefore, in 
a dangerous state.
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